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Abstract
This article aims to analyse the Indonesian State’s laws regarding models of  
religious education, by evaluating Law No. 20/2003, concerning the national 
system of  education and other related laws. Two questions are highlighted: 
What type of  religious education is favoured by Indonesian state? Does the 
preference for a certain type of  religious education reflect a specific vision of  
the state-religion relationship? Our data consisted of  two sources: the State’s 
law on national education system, Law No. 20/2003, and the minutes of  
the Indonesian parliament meeting approving the law. We found that Law 
No. 20/2003 expresses the preference of  the government for a mono-religious 
model. Indonesia is categoreized as having preferred treatment for some religions 
or support for a particular religious tradition. This categorisation is confirmed 
by the results of  our research findings indicated by the preferential treatment 
delivered by the State, and the State’s legislation and regulations on religion.
[Tulisan ini menganalisis legislasi negara terhadap pendidikan agama dengan 
cara mengevaluasi UU No. 20/2003 tentang Sistem Pendidikan Nasional 
beserta perundang-undangan terkait lainnya. Dua pertanyaan berusaha untuk 
dijawab dalam tulisan ini, yaitu: Model pendidikan agama yang bagaimana 
yang menjadi preferensi negara? Apakah preferensi tersebut merefleksikan 
visi negara terhadap model relasi negara-agama tertentu? Tulisan ini merujuk 
kepada dua data utama, yaitu: UU No. 20/2003 tentang Sistem Pendidikan 
Nasional serta Risalah Rapat Paripurna ke-35 DPR RI tahun 2003 
yang mengesahkan UU No. 20/2003. Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa 
UU Sistem Pendidikan Nasional merefleksikan preferensi negara terhadap 
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model pendidikan agama mono-relijius. Model pendidikan mono-religius 
ini merefleksikan preferensi negara terhadap model relasi negara-agama 
preferensial; negara mengakui lebih dari satu agama resmi dan memberi 
dukungan kepada institusi-institusinya, yang direfleksikan melalui legislasi 
dan peraturan terkait agama.]
Keywords: models of  religious education, models of  State-religion 
relationship, laws analysis
A. Introduction 
Indonesian Parliament’s approval on 20 June 2003 of  Law No. 
20/2003 concerning the national education system has raised many 
questions, specifically with regard to the aim of  national education and 
articles regulating religious education. Public debates responding to the 
draft on the national education system have been reported by local and 
national mass media during the three months prior to the approval of  
the bill by the parliament. The public responded to the draft of  the bill 
by heated public debate in electronic media and newspapers; but also 
through demonstrations, both in favour of  and against the draft. This 
law is a crucial document for understanding the State’s preference for a 
certain type of  religious education. 
Discussions prior to the approval of  the bill shed some light on 
the power relations between so-called Islamic groups and secular groups 
(together with non-Muslim groups). Even though a power struggle has 
existed since the early period of  Indonesian independence in 1945, it 
became manifest in the discussions around the bill. Some researchers 
have indicated that Law No. 20/2003 merely expresses the interest 
of  the religious majority group in having their model of  religious 
education acknowledged by the State, and their education institutions 
accommodated in order to gain more State support.1 
 Considering the importance of  Law No. 20/2003, there has 
not been much research analysing this legislation on education. Ichwan 
wrote his dissertation on the New Order and post-New Order politics of  
1 Moch. Nur Ichwan, “Official Reform of  Islam: State Islam and the Ministry 
of  Religious Affairs in Contemporary Indonesia, 1966-2004”, Ph.D. Dissertation 
(Tilburg: Universiteit van Tilburg, 2006); Robert W. Hefner (ed.), Remaking Muslim Politics: 
Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Abd. 
Rachman Assegaf, Politik Pendidikan Nasional: Pergeseran Kebijakan Pendidikan Agama Islam 
dari Praproklamasi ke Reformasi (Yogyakarta: Kurnia Kalam, 2005).
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Islam and its impacts on the reform of  Islamic affairs, especially those 
developed by the Ministry of  Religious Affairs from 1966 to 2004.2 A 
part of  his study investigates the official reform of  Islamic education, 
and the shifting paradigm of  national education, from a secular to a 
more religious character. Other research on religious education after 
the New Order administration was conducted by Permani,3 who studied 
the influence of  Law No. 20/2003 on the economic aspects of  Islamic 
schools in Indonesia. According to Permani, Law No. 20/2003 gives 
Islamic schools (such as madrasah) and some Islamic community learning 
centres (such as the majelis taklim) political recognition; and as a result of  
this, they receive more financial support from the government. None 
of  these studies has analysed Law No. 20/2003 from a pedagogical 
perspective. What type of  religious education has been favoured by the 
post-New Order regime after 1998? Which power influences the State 
in favour of  a certain type of  religious education?
This paper will analyse the preference of  the Indonesian 
government for a specific type of  religious education, by evaluating 
Law No. 20/2003 and related State laws. Moreover, we critically reflect 
on the preference for a specific type of  religious education from the 
perspective of  the relationship of  the State to religious communities 
from 1998 onwards. 
B. State-Religion Relationship
We adopt a typology for the State-religion relationship introduced 
by Jonathan Fox, which measures the role of  government’s involvement 
in religion. This typology has a strong empirical basis. It is based on 
Fox’s analysis of  the Religion and State data set, which is the result of  
a worldwide survey between 1990 and 2002, involving 175 countries.4 
 Fox distinguishes between two core possibilities, namely 
separation of  state and religion, and state involvement in religion.5 
Separation of  State and religion is the absence of  any State support 
for any religion, as well as the absence of  any State restrictions on 
2 Ichwan, “Official Reform of  Islam”.
3 Risti Permani, “The Economics of  Islamic Education: Evidence from 
Indonesia”, Ph.D. Dissertation (Australia: University of  Adelaide, School of  Economics, 
2010).
4 Jonathan Fox, A World Survey of  Religion and the State (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008).
5 Ibid.
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religion or any regulation with regard to religion. State involvement in 
religion includes all four forms of  actions of  the State with regard to 
religion: support, restriction, legislation and regulation. Fox furthermore 
distinguishes between positive and negative involvement. In the case of  
positive State involvement, Fox postulates five models, ranging from the 
most positive to the least positive involvement in religion (models 1 to 5 
below). In the case of  negative State involvement, Fox postulates three 
models, ranging from the least negative to the most negative involvement 
in religion (models 6 to 8 below). We now present the eight models of  
State-religion relationship in greater detail, starting with five models of  
positive involvement. Fox specifically uses criterion 4 (religious regulation) 
to describe the negative involvement of  the State in religion. However, 
in our study, regulations could also refer to a certain degree of  positive 
State involvement.
1. State with One Official Religion
This model shows the most positive State involvement in religion, 
i.e. the most active support for a specific religion. The State identifies itself  
with one particular religion. Fox defines this model as a religious State 
model, where one religion is mandatory for all citizens; or as an absolute 
theocracy6. The State intensively endorses preferential treatment for the 
official religion, while members of  non-State religions are restricted, 
prohibited from expressing their religious identity. The theocratic model 
has a high level of  religious discrimination, and the State allows little 
room for dissenters. The State enforces religious education in public 
schools, and determines its aims, methods and curriculum content, to 
ensure that the practice of  religious education is consistent with the State’s 
vision of  religion. The State establishes an official institution to deal 
with religious affairs, and to promote the ‘true’ religion. In this model, 
the State promulgates regulations to promote the official religion and 
to strengthen the role of  official religion in public domains. Religious 
teachings, citizenship and society are blended, and indispensable to each 
other.7
6 Cole W. Durham Jr, “Perspectives on Religious Liberty: A Comparative 
Framework”, in Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective: Legal Perspectives, ed. by Johan 
David Van der Vyver and John Witte (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers, 1996), 
pp. 1–44.
7 Fox, A World Survey of  Religion, p. 49.
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2. State with more than One Official Religion
In this model, the degree of  positive involvement is slightly less than 
in the previous model, but the State still has a high positive involvement 
in religion. The State acknowledges more than one official religion 
and supports religious institutions.8 It applies preferential treatment to 
protect officially recognised religions, and to restrict membership of  
non-official religions. Religious discrimination towards official religions 
does not exist in this model, but may exist towards members of  the non-
official religions. Members of  non-official religions may not be allowed 
to conduct their activities or promote their teachings and identities. The 
State enacts religious legislation through the establishment of  a State 
institution, such as the Ministry of  Religious Affairs. This institution 
aims to organise official religions, for instance by supervising religious 
practices and interaction between adherents of  different religions. 
The State produces religious regulations to protect religious 
freedom and grant religious activities. Religious freedom de facto means 
to take part in one of  the official religions; and for the sake of  religious 
harmony, people are not allowed to convert to another religion, even 
within the official religions. Religious conversion is perceived as an insult 
to religious commitment. Inter-religious communication is restricted, 
because it is perceived as causing a decrease in religious identity. People 
are encouraged to learn only their own religion, in order to strengthen 
their religious identity. The State supports religious education in public 
schools, and students are required to take a course on religious education 
at every study level. Religious education aims to strengthen commitment 
to one’s own religion and to increase religious piety in the practice of  
one’s own religion. 
3. Civil Religion Model 
The civil religion model refers to the situation in which one 
religion serves unofficially as the public’s religion, although the State 
does not officially endorse a particular religion. The State acknowledges 
a specific religious tradition because it has played an important role in the 
country’s history and culture. In this model, the State attempts to separate 
itself  from religion, but remains positively engaged with religion. State 
regulations aim at equal protection and support of  all religious groups. 
Therefore, negative State involvement and religious discrimination do 
not exist in this model. Also, unlike in the models mentioned previously, 
8 Ibid.
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the State does not produce legislation either to restrict religions or to 
organise and supervise the practice of  and interaction between adherents 
from different religions.
4. Cooperation Model
In the cooperation model, the degree of  separation between 
State and religion is greater than in the civil religion model, and the 
positive involvement of  the State in religion is less intense. The State 
neither restricts members of  religious minorities, nor discriminates 
against them – as in the civil religion model but unlike the civil religion 
model, in the cooperation model the State does not grant special status 
to a certain dominant religious tradition. Even though the State falls 
short of  endorsing a particular religion, certain religions benefit from 
State support more than others. In this model, the larger religious 
denominations benefit more from State involvement, but the State does 
not specifically endorse any religious organisations, as it is committed 
to giving equal treatment to all religious groups. The State also does not 
produce religious legislation either to restrict certain religious groups 
or to oversee their religious activities. Through its regulations, the State 
may provide significant funding for religious activities, such as religious 
education in public schools, the maintenance of  places of  worship, and 
the subsidy of  religious schools.9
5. Supportive Model 
The supportive model has the weakest positive State involvement 
in religion compared to the previous models. In this model, the State 
might insist on separation of  State and religion, but retain benevolent 
neutrality towards religion(s). The State might promote religions 
slightly, and support all religions more or less equally. This model can 
be seen as similar to the cooperation model, in the sense that the State 
accommodates religious symbols in public settings, provides religious 
holidays, etc.; and may recognise the importance of  religion as a part of  
national or local culture. In this model, there is no negative involvement 
of  the State through preferential treatment or religious discrimination. 
The next three models all reflect negative involvement of  the State 
in religion, ranging from the least negative involvement (model 6) to 
the highest level of  negative involvement (model 8). These models also 
indicate that the more the State is negatively involved in religion, the less 
9 Ibid., p. 50.
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it separates itself  from religion. In these models, the State uses religious 
legislation and regulations to treat religions negatively.10
6. Separationist Model
This model insists on rigid separation of  State and religion; and to 
a certain degree, the State is apathetic towards religion. Any suggestion of  
State support for religion is considered inappropriate.11 Religious symbols 
are not allowed in public displays, and subsidies for religions through tax 
deductions are suspect. The State produces legislation and regulations to 
limit religious activities, but does not engage in religious discrimination or 
have a negative attitude towards all religion. In the separationist model, 
religious education is not permitted in public schools, but some teachings 
about religions from an objective point of  view –such as history and 
phenomenology of  religions– are permitted. Members of  religious clergy 
are restricted from holding public office. In a more extreme form of  
separationist model, the State produces legislation on religion and makes 
strong attempts to limit religious activities in public life. 
7. Inadvertent Insensitivity Model 
In this model the State maintains separation from religion, and 
therefore preferential treatment, religious discrimination and religious 
legislation are not found in this model. With regard to the religious 
regulations, the State often fails to distinguish between the use of  
regulations in secular settings and their use in religious settings, for 
example in land-use planning, labour discrimination, etc. The State 
is inadvertent, in the sense that its regulations do not consider their 
implications for religious lives, and that they might be hostile towards 
religions. At this point, this model is in agreement with the next model, 
the hostility model, in which the State is hostile to religion. 
8. Hostility Model
This model has the most negative State involvement in religion. 
According to this model, the State is hostile towards all religions, and 
sometimes even prosecutes them. Preferential treatment and religious 
discrimination do not exist in this model, as the State has a high negative 
involvement in all religions. The State produces legislation to control 
religion and to neutralise its influence in society. The State forbids 
10 Ibid., p. 49.
11 Ibid., p. 48.
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religious activities and places of  worship, and prevents religion from 
becoming a separate source of  authority or basis for opposition. In 
the hostility model, the State enacts religious regulation to monitor 
and restraint religious activities. According to the State’s regulation, all 
religious institutions should be registered, and must get State permission 
to conduct religious activities. Religious symbols and identity are banned 
in the public sphere. Any form of  religious symbol or identity in public 
life is regarded as an offence to the State’s authority. 
C. Types of  Religious Education
In the following discussion, we describe different types of  religious 
education. We distinguish between mono-religious, multi-religious and 
inter-religious models of  religious education based on the differences in 
cognitive, affective and attitudinal aspects in these models of  religious 
education.12 
1.  Mono-religious Model
Cognitively, the mono-religious model provides knowledge of  and 
insight into one’s own religion. This model leads to the construction 
of  religious identity in accordance with one’s own religious tradition. 
Through religious education, a person can grow deeper in faith and 
belong more strongly to a specific religious community. Dialogue may be 
conducted only for the purpose of  conversion, rather than to promote 
mutual understanding. Affectively, the mono-religious model aims to 
increase a person’s interest and involvement in a particular religion. 
Attitudinally, this model is meant to inculcate the motivation to participate 
in the religious practices of  one’s own religion. The mono-religious model 
only focuses on a particular religion. However, this does not necessarily 
imply complete disregard for other religions; they may be discussed 
from the perspective of  one’s own tradition, aiming to affirm one’s own 
religious tradition (content). The mono-religious model is taught through 
internalisation of  the beliefs, values and rituals of  one’s own religious 
tradition, without critical thinking (methods). 
12 Carl Sterkens, Interreligious Learning: The Problem of  Interreligious Dialogue in Primary 
Education (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2001); C.A.M. Hermans, Participatory 
Learning: Religious Education in a Globalizing Society (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 
2003); Carl Sterkens and Mohamad Yusuf, “Preferences for Religious Education and 
Inter-Group Attitudes among Indonesian Students”, Journal of  Empirical Theology, vol. 
28, no. 1 (2015), pp. 49–89.
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2. Multi-religious Model
The multi-religious model emphasises the need to deal with 
religious plurality. Cognitively, this model aims to introduce a person to 
many religions. Different religions are presented in terms of  their own 
self-understanding. Affectively, this model aims to stimulate interest in 
studying different religions. Attitudinally, the multi-religious model tries 
to cultivate a respectful attitude towards people from different religions. 
The content of  the multi-religious model consists of  information about 
different religious traditions, presented in their own terms. Other religions 
are not viewed from the viewpoint of  any other religion, because each 
religion is described according to its own terms (content). The multi-
religious model emphasises the accumulation of  information about the 
beliefs, values and rituals of  different religious traditions (methods). 
3. Inter-religious model 
The inter-religious model focuses on the dialogue between followers 
of  different religions. This model seeks to express the uniqueness of  each 
religious tradition, and at the same time to evaluate religious plurality in 
a positive way. Affectively, this model aims at effective communication 
between one’s own religion and other religious traditions. Attitudinally, 
this model stimulates respect and willingness to engage in dialogue 
between religions. The inter-religious model is concerned with different 
religions from the point of  view of  a certain religion and other religions 
(content). The inter-religious model is taught through the internalisation 
of  one’s own religion, and the clarification of  other religions through 
dialogue (methods).
D. Preferred Type of  Religious Education
This section aims to answer the following question: ‘What type 
of  religious education is favoured by the State, as mentioned in Law 
No. 20/2003 and related regulations?” In order to answer this question, 
we analyse three aspects of  above-mentioned law, namely: the aim of  
national education; the aim of  religious education; and the curriculum 
content of  religious education.
1. Aim of  National Education 
We refer to article 3 of  Law No. 20/2003, which regulates the 
function and aim of  national education. It stipulates that: 
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National education functions to develop abilities, and to form dignified 
character and national civilisation in order to educate national life; (it) aims 
to develop the students’ potentials so that they become persons imbued 
with human values who are faithful and pious to the one and only God ….
This article was initially split into two articles: the first (article 3) 
refers to the function of  national education, while the second (article 
4) explains the aim of  national education. The last meeting of  the 
Standing Committee of  the House of  Representatives, held before 
the plenary meeting, decided to conflate articles 3 and 4 into one. But 
the resulting article maintains the distinction between the function and 
the aim of  national education. On one hand, the function of  national 
education has secular characteristics, in the sense that it emphasises the 
relationship between citizen and State, and deals with the development 
of  intellectual capacity. On the other, the aim of  national education has 
religious characteristics. It relates to religious and spiritual development, 
and to the relationship between an individual person and God. 
According to Law No. 20/2003, the aim of  national education 
is to create a faithful and pious individual. The new article obliges 
educational processes to train students to be religiously faithful, to have 
strong religious commitment, and to be pious. The word for religious 
commitment (beriman) refers to a strong obligation to religion – belief  
in God and commitment to a certain religious denomination. The word 
for religious devotion (bertakwa) means obedience in one’s involvement 
in the religious practices of  one’s own religion. 
2. Aim of  Religious Education
To analyse the aim of  religious education, we refer particularly 
to article 30.2 and article 12.1 point (a) of  Law No. 20/2003. The law 
has a special place for religious education not granted to other subjects. 
It defines its aim in great detail, as well as formulating its curriculum 
content. Article 30.2 of  Law No. 20/2003 stipulates that: “Religious 
education has the function to prepare students to become community members who 
understand and practise religious values and/or acquire expertise in his or her own 
religion.” According to this article, the aim of  religious education focuses 
on two aspects: understanding and practising religion. By understanding 
religion, students are expected to become committed [beriman] to their 
own religion. ‘Practising religion’ refers to religious devotion [bertakwa]. 
This corresponds to the aim of  national education described previously – 
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to be committed to a certain religion [beriman] and to be devoted through 
the internalisation of  religious values and practices [bertakwa]. How should 
religious education be implemented by students in order to achieve its 
stated aim, for them to have strong religious faith and to practise religion? 
Article 12.1.a stipulates that: “Every student in an educational unit deserves 
to receive religious education in accordance with his or her religion, imparted by an 
educator from a similar religious tradition.” This states the rights of  students, 
implying an obligation to be fulfilled by the school. However, these are 
not individual rights, but rather the rights of  the community.
To further clarify Law No. 20/2003, especially with regard to 
the aim and implementation of  religious education in schools, the 
government released Government Regulation [Peraturan Pemerintah] No. 
55/2007 concerning religious education, enacted in October 2007. Article 
1.2 stipulates that: “Religious education is aimed at developing students’ abilities 
in comprehending, embracing and practising religious values […]” This article 
emphasises three important activities in the study of  religion, namely 
to comprehend, to embrace and to practice religion. The word for ‘to 
comprehend’ (memahami) refers to the cognitive aspect of  education. ‘To 
embrace’ (menghayati) is a typical Indonesian term implying the affective 
aspect of  education. ‘To practise’ (mengamalkan) implies a continuous 
activity, referring to the attitudinal aspect. Article 1.2 is consistent 
with the aim of  religious education stated in article 30.2 of  Law No. 
20/2003; religious education emphasises the development of  religious 
understanding and encourages religious practices. 
But Government Regulation No. 55/2007 presents another aspect 
to be included in the aim of  religious education, namely ‘to embrace’ 
(menghayati), referring to the affective aspect of  religious education. 
Government Regulation No. 55/2007 affirms article 12.1a of  Law No. 
20/2003 with regard to the obligation of  schools to provide students 
with religious education in their own religion, taught by a teacher from 
a similar religious tradition. Article 4.2 of  Government Regulation No. 
55/2007 mandates that: “Every student at every education unit deserves 
to receive religious education in accordance with his or her religion, 
imparted by a teacher from a similar religious background.”
Another article indicating a preference for a mono-religious model 
is article 4.5 of  Government Regulation No. 55/2007, which stipulates 
that “each education unit provides a space and opportunity for students 
to practise their own religious rituals.” According to this article, students 
are entitled to practise religious rituals in schools; this is consistent with 
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the definition of  the national education system stated in article 1.1 of  Law 
No. 20/2003, that a school should become a learning environment which 
supports students in developing their potential for obtaining spiritual 
and religious strength through their own religion. Moreover, article 5.3 
of  Government Regulation No. 55/2007 mandates that:
Religious education encourages students to obey their religious teachings 
in daily life and utilise religion as the foundation of  ethics and morality 
in their personal lives, families, society, and national life.
3. Curriculum Content of  Religious Education
How should religious education be taught in the classroom? Which 
aspects are being considered in the course of  religious education? Law No. 
20/2003 addresses the main aspects to be included in the development 
of  the curriculum content of  national education. Article 36.3 of  Law 
No. 20/2003 stipulates that: 
The curriculum development is organized in line with the level of  
education within the framework of  the Republic of  Indonesia by taking 
into account […] the enhancement of  religious commitment and religious 
devotion.
This article confirms the other articles of  Law No. 20/2003 
concerned, with the inclusion of  the phrases “to have strong religious 
commitment” and “to have religious devotion” as the main aspects to 
be included in the aim of  the national education system, as well as in the 
aim of  religious education in Indonesia.
Regulation No. 16/2010 of  the Ministry of  Religious Affairs 
gives guidance on the management of  religious education in schools, to 
be consistent with Law No. 20/2003 and Government Regulation No. 
55/2007. According to article 6 of  MORA Regulation No. 16/2010, 
The standard formulation of  religious education content as mentioned 
by article 5 verse (1) means (a) to deepen and to widen the students’ 
knowledge and religious insight; (b) to encourage students to practise their 
religious teachings in daily life; (c) to position religion as the foundation 
of  noble character in personal life, family, society, and national life.
These articles (6a, b and c) clearly confirm the State’s preference 
for a mono-religious model. Religious education should aim to develop 
knowledge of  one’s own religions (point a), to instil commitment to 
the religious rituals of  one’s own religion (point b), and to engage with 
the beliefs and values of  one’s own religion (point c). Referring to the 
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indicators introduced in our previous discussion (section 2.3.2), point (a) 
refers to the cognitive aspect of  the mono-religious model, while point 
(b) corresponds with the affective aim, and point (c) is compatible with 
the attitudinal aim. 
E. Religious Education in the Perspective of  the State-Religion 
Relationship
This section aims to investigate whether the State’s preference 
for a mono-religious model reflects a specific view of  the State-religion 
relationship. We refer particularly to the process in which Law No. 
20/2003 was approved in parliament. In our analysis we use the minutes 
of  the parliamentary meeting dated 10 June 2003. We address two 
questions: (1) to what extend did Islamic and secular (together with non-
Islamic) political factions influence the decisions made in the parliament 
meeting? (2) Which arguments did these two groups deliver to justify 
their support, particularly with regard to the inclusion of  religious values 
and the school’s obligation to provide religious education in line with 
each student’s one’s own religion? 
1. The Influence of  Religious Communities on Policymaking
The purpose of  the plenary meeting on 10 June 2003 was mainly 
to hear the final statements and remarks from each political faction on 
the draft of  the State’s legislation on the national system of  education. 
We will investigate the power relations between the Muslim and secular 
(and non-Muslim) groups as demonstrated at that meeting.
The minutes show that the plenary meeting was attended by two 
ministers (the Minister of  Education and Culture, and the Coordinative 
Minister for General Welfare), who represented the government, and 
287 out of  498 members of  parliament – 57.6 per cent of  all members. 
All political factions were meant to have an opportunity to deliver their 
final statement and remarks on the draft for the national education 
system legislation. However, all members of  the PDI-P (a secular party) 
abstained. 
Even though the PDI-P party was the only political faction to 
abstain, the table indicates that some members from other political parties 
did join the meeting. This is because they dissented with the decision of  
their political party over the draft. But even though they were present at 
the meeting and delivered their refusal, it would not have helped to change 
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the draft. For instance, Mr. Immanuel Ekadianus Blegur and Mr. Simon 
Patrice Morin from Golkar Party (Islam-friendly party), and Mr. Gregorius 
Seto Harianto from the National Awakening Party (Islamist party) were 
Christians who refused to participate in the plenary meeting, though 
their parties took part in the meeting to approve the draft. However, as 
the percentage of  parliament members joining the meeting was over 51 
per cent –the minimum number of  participants to be able to hold the 
meeting– the meeting was executed. 
Surprisingly, the meeting paid little attention to the content of  the 
draft, which had some controversial articles. This was quite different 
from the situation outside the parliament building; mass demonstrations 
occurred in several parts of  the country. Supporters and opponents of  
the draft had been clashing since March 2003 – three months before the 
plenary meeting. Why did the members of  parliament not criticise the 
content of  the draft? The answer is simply that almost all the members 
opposing the draft abstained from the meeting. The minutes indicate 
that Islamic values coloured the plenary meeting. Indeed, six out of  
nine political factions based their arguments for supporting the draft on 
Islamic texts: the Quran or Hadith. An example of  the Quran cited, for 
instance, is 58:11 which says:
[…] and when ye are told to rise up, rise up; God will raise you up, to (suitable) ranks 
(and degrees), those of  you who believe and who have been granted (mystic) Knowledge. 
And God is well-acquainted with all ye do.
This verse is quoted by the PPP and the PBB (both Islamist parties) 
to support the need for integration between the secular and the religious 
domains, as well as between knowledge enhancement and religious 
commitment (faith). Knowledge per se cannot stand alone, and should 
be based on religious commitment. 
The other verse recited by this political faction is 5:2, 
[…] help ye one another in righteousness and piety, but help ye not one another in sin 
and rancour: fear God: for God is strict in punishment.
This verse is used to support the involvement of  religious 
commitment and devotion in the articles of  Law No. 20/2003. It shows 
the shift of  the State’s policy on national education, from the secular to 
the religious. This reflects the fact that Islamic political groups (both 
Islam-friendly and Islamist parties) are dominant in the decision of  the 
parliament to approve the draft of  the national system of  education. 
They stress Islamic values to justify their political manoeuvring of  the 
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inclusion of  the religious values into the draft of  the national system 
of  education. 
2. Statements of  Political Factions Justifying the Draft
With which arguments did the political fractions justify the draft, 
particularly with regard to the inclusion of  religious values and the 
school’s obligation to provide religious education based on one’s own 
religion? According to the secular groups, the draft legislation would 
create religious favouritism and trigger communal tensions, as happened 
in 1997 to 2000. Their view was that the draft represented only the 
interests of  the Muslim majority group. The minutes indicate that there 
was an informal meeting between the chairman and the leaders of  each 
political faction following the plenary meeting to discuss two controversial 
issues: the article addressing the aim of  national education (article 3), 
and the article that obliging schools to provide religious education for 
students appropriate to the religion of  the students and taught by a teacher 
from a similar religious tradition (article 13). These were criticised not 
only by the non-Muslim groups (especially the Roman Catholics and 
Protestants), but also by the liberal progressive Muslim groups, as well 
as secular groups. The political parties who participated in the meeting 
–the majority of  which were Muslim groups– agreed that those issues 
will not be discussed in the plenary, and that each political faction would 
support the draft legislation. 
The next discussion presents the statements from each political 
faction. We will begin with the secular parties, followed by the Islam-
friendly and Islamist parties.
The PDI-P won the 1999 general election, with 30.5 per cent of  the 
total seats in parliament. This party is made up predominantly of  secular 
and non-Muslim voters. All members of  the PDI-P refused to attend 
the plenary meeting. One reason was that PDI-P disagreed with some 
articles in the draft, especially those related to the inclusion of  religious 
values in the aim of  national education, and to State intervention in the 
practice of  religious education in private schools. In the refusal letter to 
the chairman of  the plenary meeting – signed by Mr. Roy BB Janis and 
Mr. Tjahyo Kumolo (chairman and secretary of  the PDI-P faction), the 
PDI-P insisted that parliament hold a major public discussion, in which 
scholars (i.e. academics, religious leaders, education activists) would be 
invited to discuss the draft in greater detail. In their press conference, as 
reported by the daily Kompas on 11 June 2003, Janis stated (referring to 
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article 1.1 of  the draft legislation) that 
this bill will not only cause polarisation between supporters and 
opponents, but is also very weak in the framework of  law. Obviously, the 
bill is against the ideal objective of  education, that is, to educate national 
life. The objective should not be to create pious individuals.
 In this particular context, the PDI-P urged parliament to return 
to the neutral characteristics of  the State’s previous law, No. 2/1989, and 
demanded State impartiality to all religious communities. 
The other secular party, the Indonesian United Nation Party [Partai 
Kesatuan Kebangsaan Indonesia, or KKI], initially refused to give their final 
speech responding to the draft. Some KKI members, for instance Mr. G. 
Seto Harianto, Mr. K. Tunggul Sirait and Mr. Arnold Nicolas Radjawane, 
sent letters of  refusal to the chairman and wanted to withdraw from their 
responsibility as parliamentary members to take part in the decision-
making. Eventually the party participated in the meeting, and delivered 
its position on the draft. Mr. Birinus Joseph Rahawadan, spokesperson 
of  the KKI, pointed out that 
[…] if  most members of  the parliament wish to approve it today [without 
any further public discussion], then we just want to say that we could not 
and do not want to obstruct it; but please allow us to respectively deliver 
a different opinion, dissenting with some articles in this bill. 
The party argued that article 12.1.a has legalised State intervention, 
especially over the private and public spheres, in this case [over] the 
students’ and the parents’ [freedom]. Obviously, the State should not 
and does not need to intervene.
The Golkar Party was the second most popular party in parliament 
in terms of  seats and the biggest of  the Islam-friendly parties at that 
time. According to this party, the 1998 crisis in Indonesia was caused 
predominantly caused by the moral crisis. As pointed out by its 
spokesperson, Mr. H. Agusman St. Basa, the Golkar party stood for the 
need to rebuild the national character, among other things, through the 
involvement of  religious values in State laws. The practice of  education, 
especially of  religious education, would help students to enhance religious 
commitment and practise religious rituals. He stated that: 
[…] education itself  is a process in which its ultimate objective is to mature 
the responsible citizens through educational processes. Obviously, [the 
objective of  education] is not sufficient if  only to develop the intelligence 
potentialities, it should also develop the potentialities in faith, piety, and 
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noble character [...]
He refers in his argument to the aim of  national education, stated 
in article 30.3 of  the Constitution amendment 2002, which emphasises 
the development of  religious commitment and religious devotion in 
national education. From this statement, we might conclude that the 
Golkar party agrees on the inclusion of  religious values in the aim of  
national education. 
The opinions of  the National Awakening Party [Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa, or PKB] on the inclusion of  religious values and the obligation 
of  schools to teach a mono-religious model are similar to the statements 
made by the Golkar party. According to the spokesperson of  the PKB, 
Mr. K.H. Khalilurrahman, to have religious values in law is consistent 
with the spirit of  the reformasi – that is, to put religion in a more central 
position in the public domains including in the national system of  
education. He stated: 
Under the oppression of  the totalitarian and authoritarian power in the 
past, we could understand the people’s suspicion over the possibility of  
State intervention in religious affairs in society through the law. However, 
it is impossible to think of  such intervention nowadays when the curtain 
of  reformation has widely opened, and in [a time characterised by] 
democratisation and human-rights enforcement.
This party relates democracy to two types of  freedom: freedom 
from State intervention and freedom from the promotion of  religious 
values in State laws. Obviously, this statement contradicts the section 
of  the draft welcoming State intervention in the practice of  religious 
education in private schools. According to this party, providing students 
with religious education about their own religion is consistent with human 
rights; that is, the right to learn in one’s own religion and to practise 
one’s own religious rituals. Most members of  the PKB party have been 
educated in the pesantren tradition. It is therefore no surprise that the draft 
treats the madrasah and pesantren systems as on an equal footing with the 
public education system. This party encourages the State to support the 
Islamic education system so that they can develop better in the future. 
The responses from the Islamist parties were rather similar to 
those of  the Islam-friendly parties. The Islamist parties believe that 
intellectual capacity should be complemented by religious morality and 
spirituality as the primary aim of  national education. The spokesperson 
of  the PPP party, Mr. H. Muhammad Abduh Paddare, states that: “[…] 
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meanwhile the implementation [of  religious education] is particularly to 
increase religious commitment [keimanan], religious devotion [ketakwaan], 
and noble character [akhlak mulia] [...] ”This party also considered that 
the article obliging schools to provide students with religious education 
in their own religion was the best way to manage the religious plurality 
of  Indonesia. Paddare suggested that: 
Regarding some articles which are problematic, especially those connected 
to the situation of  being a plural nation, we believe that pluralism has 
been accommodated well in this bill, that is, by giving the right to every 
student to learn, explore and implement the religion that they believe 
in. This bill protects the freedom of  religion, and forbids teaching of  a 
certain religion to students which is different from their own religion. 
According to this party, introducing students to the teachings of  
other religions would violate their religious freedom. 
 The minutes show that the Reformation faction is the most active 
faction in parliament, forcing parliament members to approve the draft 
without any changes. This party seems to have taken advantage of  the 
absence from the meeting of  the PDI-P members and some Christian 
members. The Reformation faction stated that article 13 of  the draft 
represented the first and foremost pillar of  the ideology of  Pancasila, 
the belief  in the one and only God, which is the opposite of  the secular 
ideology. According to the spokesperson of  this faction, Mr. Muhammadi, 
every person who disagrees with article 13 (the obligation to study only 
one’s own religion) should be considered secular. As mentioned in section 
1.3.2, secularism has a negative connotation in Indonesia, and secular 
persons are considered rebels.  
 The PBB party forced parliament to approve the draft legislation 
because it was consistent with and represented the national ideology of  
Pancasila and Constitution amendment 2002, particularly with regard to 
the need to include religious values. The spokesperson of  the PBB, Mr. 
K.H. Nadjih Ahjat, said that: 
The national education of  Indonesia should pay attention not only to 
the domain of  knowledge or the intellectual aspects, but also to the 
domain of  religious commitment or faith [keimanan], religious devotion 
[ketakwaan] and the formation of  noble character [akhlak mulia]. Students 
should be able to deepen their own religious values in order to behave in 
accordance with those values.
 With regard to the obligation of  schools to provide religious 
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education in accordance with the religion of  their students, this party 
points out that: “One fundamental right for students is to receive religious 
education which is appropriate to their own religion, though they study 
in a school belonging to a different religion.”
F. An Ideal Type of  Religious Education
Law No. 20/2003 expresses the preference of  the Indonesian 
government for a mono-religious model. Article 12.1 point (a) stipulates 
that every student must receive religious education in accordance with 
his or her own religion, imparted by an educator from a similar religious 
tradition. The preference for the mono-religious model is furthermore 
regulated by articles in a lower-ranking law – Government Regulation 
No. 55/2007. Article 4.5 of  this regulation states that each education 
unit should provide a place for religious worship and an opportunity 
for students to practise their own religious rituals. Students must not 
only understand their own religion, but must also be able to practise the 
religious rituals of  their own religion. Article 5.3 stipulates that religious 
education should encourage students to obey their religious teachings 
in daily life, and use religious values and norms as the basis of  morality 
in their personal life, in society, and in national life. 
According to article 6 of  Ministry of  Religious Education 
Regulation No. 16/2010, the formulation of  the curriculum content 
for religious education should aim (a) to deepen and widen students’ 
knowledge of  and insight into their own religion, (b) to encourage 
students to practise their own religious teachings in daily life, (c) to 
position religion as the foundation of  noble character in personal life, 
family, society, and national life. From our theoretical perspective, point 
(a) might refer to the cognitive aspect of  religious education, while points 
(b) and (c) refer to the attitudinal aspect. The article seems to confirm our 
previous discussion that the State expects religious values to play a role in 
building the nation. Through religious education, students are expected 
to internalise values rooted in the teachings of  their own religion, and 
implement them in their daily activities.
How do we understand these findings? The State’s laws clearly 
indicate that Muslim students should only learn Islam, Christians should 
only study Christianity, and Hindu students should only study Hinduism. 
In other words, religious education should not provide an opportunity 
for students to learn about other religions, or to come to mutual 
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understanding or have dialogue with other religious believers. Article 
12.1 point (a) of  Law No. 20/2003 uses the word ‘deserve’, referring to 
the rights of  students which need to be fulfilled by schools. However, 
in order to understand this correctly, we need to understand these are 
not the rights of  individuals, but of  communities. The State demands 
students who are committed to their community, and who hold and 
practise similar normative values to the community. Article 30.2 of  Law 
No. 20/2003 states that through religious education, the State expects 
to prepare students to become community members who understand 
and practise the religious values of  their own religion. This reflects the 
communitarian idea, stressing the importance of  communal cohesion. A 
certain value is considered good because that value is embedded in the 
community.13 When students do not learn the religious education of  their 
own religious community, this breaks the cohesion of  the community. 
The preference for the mono-religious model also reflects the 
underlying fear of  some Muslim groups that Christian schools will 
convert Muslim students to Christianity. Steenbrink14  studied this in 
the city of  Yogyakarta, where some 16,500 Muslim students of  primary 
schools received Christian religious education. Most Christian schools 
provide only Christian religious education – for all students, regardless 
of  their religious background. In his research about the threatened 
feeling among Indonesian Muslims, Mujiburrahman discovered that 
Muslim groups perceive Christian schools as a means for promoting 
Christian teachings and converting others to Christianity. According to 
Mujiburrahman,15 Muslim students at a Christian school who are given 
Christian religious education will face at least two potential problems: 
they may become sceptical of  and uncommitted to Islamic teachings, 
and they may convert to Christianity. 
G. Concluding Remarks
Fox categorises Indonesia post-New Order regime as having 
“preferred treatment for some religions or support for a particular 
13 Robert Alun Jones, Emile Durkheim: An Introduction to Four Major Works 
(Universitas Michigan: SAGE Publications, 1986).
14 Karel Steenbrink, Catholics in Indonesia, 1808-1942: A Documented History. 
Volume 2: The Spectacular Growth of  a Self  Confident Minority, 1903-1942 (Leiden: KITLV 
Press, 2007).
15 Mujiburrahman, Feeling Threatened: Muslim-Christian Relations in Indonesia’s New 
Order (Leiden: Amsterdam University Press; ISIM, 2006), p. 243.
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religious tradition”.16 His categorisation is confirmed by the results of  our 
research findings (particularly with regard to the State-religion relationship 
in Indonesia), indicated by the preferential treatment delivered by the 
State, and the State’s legislation and regulations on religion. 
With regard to preferential treatment, the State adopts religious 
values from the Islamic tradition in its laws. Indeed, the involvement of  
religious values can be traced back to the Constitution as amended in 
2002. The amendment stipulated that the national system of  education 
should involve religious values. Since then, religious values have become 
an important aspect of  laws dealing with education. 
Obviously, the post-New Order era has seen a rejection of  the 
religious political restrictions and repressive approach towards religious 
activities in the public sphere.17 The resignation of  President Suharto 
in May 1998 presented an opportunity for religious political groups, 
including the Islamic groups, to enter national politics. In the first two 
general elections after the resignation of  President Suharto, Islamic 
political parties gained significant votes.18 They achieved 34.2 per cent 
in the 1999 general election, increasing slightly to 38 per cent in the 
2004 election. This is very significant compared to the achievements of  
the secular and Christian groups, who gained 34.7 per cent in 1999 but 
dropped to 19.5 per cent in 2004. As a consequence, Muslim involvement 
in State law-making is unavoidable. Hefner19 and others20 have observed 
that the growing role of  Muslim power in law-making beginning in the 
16 Fox, A World Survey of  Religion, p. 202.
17 Luthfi Assyaukanie, Islam and the Secular State in Indonesia (Institute of  Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2009).
18 Baswedan (2004) separates Indonesian political parties after the New Order 
regime into three categories: the Secular, the Islam-friendly and the Islamist parties. The 
first category contains two secular parties and one Christian party. The secular parties 
are the Indonesia Democracy-Struggle Party [Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, 
or PDI-P] and the Indonesia National Unity Party [Partai Kesatuan Kebangsaan 
Indonesia, or PKKI], while the Christian party is the Love the Nation Democratic 
Party [Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa, or PDKB]. The Islam-friendly parties are the 
Golkar Party and the National Awakening Party [Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, or PKB]. 
Finally, there are four Islamist parties: the United Development Party [Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan, or PPP], the Crescent and Star Party [Partai Bulan Bintang, or PBB], the 
Justice Party [Partai Keadilan, or PK], and the National Mandate Party [Partai Amanat 
Nasional, or PAN]. 
19 Robert W. Hefner, Making Modern Muslims: the Politics of  Islamic Education in 
Southeast Asia (Honolulu: Univ. of  Hawaii Press, 2009).
20 R. William Liddle, “Indonesia in 1999: Democracy Restored”, Asian Survey, 
vol. 40, no. 1 (2000), pp. 32–40; Baswedan, “Political Islam in Indonesia”, pp. 669–90.
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last 10 years of  President Suharto’s administration was triggered by at 
least two connected events: first was the replacement of  Christians with 
Muslims in the State’s bureaucracy, which implies a new composition that 
would benefit Muslim groups in accessing the political decision-making 
processes. Second is that since the late 1980s, the Golkar party –the 
government political party– has accommodated Muslim intellectuals, such 
as the alumni of  the Muslim Students Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa 
Islam, or HMI). According to Hefner, HMI alumni are currently found 
in all political parties, but the Golkar party is practically dominated and 
led by them.
With regard to education system, Law No. 20/2003 uses the 
words iman and takwa as the ultimate goal of  the national educational 
system, and akhlak, to describe moral behaviour. Iman is defined as the 
acknowledgement of  God, with full sincerity of  heart and accepting all 
His attributes and their obvious corollaries. Takwa translates to ‘self-
consciousness of  Allah’. It describes a state of  awareness of  Allah in 
everything people do, and letting that awareness guide their actions and 
shield them from harm. Akhlak is defined as disposition, nature, temper, 
ethics, morals or manners based on Islamic values and norms.21 
 The preference for a mono-religious model existed in the previous 
law (No. 2/1989), but the current law (No. 20/2003) has strengthened 
that preference. The State obliges religiously affiliated schools to provide 
Islamic religious education for Muslim students if  they admit Muslim 
students. Unlike the previous legislation (Law No. 2/1989, enacted during 
the New Order regime), Law No. 20/2003 is regarded as ‘more Islamic’. 
It reflects the Islamisation of  law, in the sense that it accommodates 
Muslim interests greatly, particularly with regard to the State’s support 
of  Islamic education systems such as madrasah and pesantren. 
Preferential treatment is also evident in the regulations produced 
by the State’s institutions. In 2010, the Ministry of  Religious Affairs 
established the Directorate General of  Islamic Education, which 
consists of  four Directorates, namely the Directorate of  Madrasah, the 
Directorate of  Islamic Primary Schools and Islamic Boarding Schools 
[Pendidikan Diniyah dan Pondok Pesantren], the Directorate of  Islamic 
Higher Education [Pendidikan Tinggi Islam], and the Directorate of  Islamic 
Religious Education [Pendidikan Agama Islam]. These institutions organise 
the Islamic education system, such as the madrasah and the pesantren 
21 Caesar E. Farah, Islam: Beliefs and Observances, 7th edition (New York: Barron’s 
Educational Series, 1968).
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(Islamic boarding schools) and formulate the national curriculum of  
Islamic education. In addition, the Ministry of  Religious Affairs uses 
its budget to support Islamic education systems such as the madrasah. 
The students of  the madrasah mostly come from a background of  lower 
economic status. 
We can also understand the mono-religious model as a social 
fact because it consists of  norms and values that are practised by 
and commonly found in all members of  society. In Indonesia, there 
is clear agreement with regard to the practice of  religious education 
by the policy-making body of  the State (politicians, government); the 
educational system of  religiously-affiliated schools, for instance school 
leaders, teachers,22 and student ideas on religious education.23 Althoug 
there are some differences in the mono-religious model employed at some 
religiously-affiliated schools, notably where schools introduce students 
to the teachings of  other religions using an outsider’s perspective, or the 
school provides mono-religious education for students not belonging to 
the religion to which the school is affiliated. But these differences are 
within the same social order, or as Durkheim says, “within the narrow 
limit of  variation”.24 They all practise religious education in such a way 
that students (should) develop knowledge based on their own religion, 
be committed to their own religion, and should become pious and moral 
persons based on the teachings of  their own religion.
The result is a challenge to the fact that Indonesia is a religiously 
pluralistic country. According to many scholars, the mono-religious model 
has at least two weaknesses: (1) with regard to the dynamic of  religious 
interpretation, and (2) its recognition of  religious plurality.25 First, with the 
mono-religious model there is no need to contextualise, because context 
does not add anything to the teaching of  religion (e.g. rituals, stories, 
22 Mohamad Yusuf  and Carl Sterkens, “Religious Education in Religiously 
Affiliated Schools and the Influence of  the State and Religious Community on School 
Politics”, in Muslim Christian Relations Observed: Comparative Studies from Indonesia and the 
Netherlands, ed. by Volker Küster, Robert Setio, and Indonesian Dutch Consortium on 
Muslim-Christian Relations (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2014), pp. 47–71.
23 Sterkens and Yusuf, “Preferences for Religious Education”.
24 Emile Durkheim, The Rules of  Sociological Method, 8th edition, ed. by George E.G. 
Catlin, trans. by Sarah A. Solovay and John H. Mueller (New York: Free Press, 1965).
25 Sterkens, Interreligious Learning, p. 52; Hans-Georg Ziebertz and Didier 
Pollefeyt, “A Move to Multi? Empirical Research Concerning the Attitudes of  Youth 
towards Pluralism and Religion’s Claims of  Truth”, in Interreligious Learning (Leuven 
Paris: Peeters Publishers and Booksellers, 2007), pp. 3–24.
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etc.). In some religious traditions, contextuality in religion is perceived 
as imperfection and deviation from the tradition of  the mainstream. For 
instance, ideas of  religious purification confirm the resistance of  religious 
communities to new ideas and insights. This idea is reflected in the aim 
of  the mono-religious model, where the identity of  a new generation 
is perceived to be a repetition of  what is considered to be the ‘original’ 
religious identity. 
Second, with regard to the recognition of  religious plurality, the 
mono-religious model does not provide students with the opportunity to 
learn about different religions and from other religious believers. Students 
are only able to enhance their knowledge of  their own religion, while 
they pretend to live in a mono-religious situation which does not actually 
exist in our global society.26 Recognition of  other religious traditions is 
a problem for the mono-religious model – it does not approach other 
religions in terms of  their own self-understanding. Other religions are 
interpreted and evaluated entirely from an outsider’s perspective, i.e. from 
the seeker’s own frame of  reference. 
There is a danger that the mono-religious model could lead to 
ethnocentrism or religiocentrism.27 It runs the risk of  strengthening 
positive in-group attitudes, and negative attitudes towards religious out-
groups. As predicted by contact theory, a consequence of  religiocentrism 
is that students trust only those who share their religious identity. It can 
cause people to refuse to have more than a minimum of  social contact 
with persons from other religions, and to have a claim to absolute 
religious truth. 
26 Hans Küng, Global Responsibility: in Search of  a New World Ethic (New York: 
Crossroad Pub. Co., 1991).
27 Sterkens, Interreligious Learning, p. 53.
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Küng, Hans, Global Responsibility: in Search of  a New World Ethic, New York: 
Crossroad Pub. Co., 1991.
Liddle, R. William, “Indonesia in 1999: Democracy Restored”, Asian Survey, 
vol. 40, no. 1, 2000, pp. 32–42 [http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3021218].
130 Al-Jāmi‘ah, Vol. 53, No. 1, 2015 M/1436 H
Mohamad Yusuf  & Carl Sterkens
Mujiburrahman, Feeling Threatened: Muslim-Christian Relations in Indonesia’s 
New Order, Leiden: Amsterdam University Press; ISIM, 2006.
Permani, Risti, “The Economics of  Islamic Education: Evidence from 
Indonesia”, Ph.D. Dissertation, Australia: University of  Adelaide, 
School of  Economics, 2010.
Steenbrink, Karel, Catholics in Indonesia, 1808-1942: A Documented History, 
Volume 2: The Spectacular Growth of  a Self  Confident Minority, 1903-1942, 
Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007.
Sterkens, Carl, Interreligious Learning: The Problem of  Interreligious Dialogue in 
Primary Education, Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2001.
Sterkens, Carl and Mohamad Yusuf, “Preferences for Religious Education 
and Inter-Group Attitudes among Indonesian Students”, Journal of  
Empirical Theology, vol. 28, no. 1, 2015, pp. 49–89 [http://dx.doi.
org/10.1163/15709256-12341324].
----, “Religious Education in Religiously Affiliated Schools and the 
Influence of  the State and Religious Community on School 
Politics”, in Muslim Christian Relations Observed: Comparative Studies 
from Indonesia and the Netherlands, ed. by Volker Küster, Robert Setio, 
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